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Introduction  
The problem of semantic change has preoccupied linguists ever since the 
beginning of the 19
th century. It was at that time when many students of language 
first realised that sense alterations can no longer be treated as corruption or 
degeneration and tried to bring them into order and system. This outburst of 
interest in meaning and its development led to the formation of a new area of 
linguistic study – the science of semasiology, later denominated into semantics. 
Although  its golden period is long gone, the study of diachronic changes in 
meaning  has  never  been  abandoned  entirely.  Notice  that  the  19
th  century 
linguists  were  fascinated  both  with  meaning  and  its  development  and 
consequently  semantics  was  a  very  productive  field  of  study  at  that  time. 
Numerous  books,  pamphlets,  treatises  dealing  with  semantic  subjects  in  the 
broadest sense of the term, dominated the linguistic scene for many decades. In 
fact,  it  was  the  study  of  semantics  that  gave  rise to modern linguistics as a 
separate branch of science.  
The way in which semantics was perceived also, in many respects, resembled 
various  Langacker’s  and  other  cognitivists’  ideas.  Bréal  (1897),  who  first 
introduces the term semantics
1 into linguistic jargon, claims that both morphology 
and syntax, as well as word-meaning, make part of it. What is more, Bréal stressed 
the overriding importance of semantics to which phonetics should be subordinated. 
The very term schema – so popular with Langacker and his followers – was a 19
th 
century invention and the idea of relying on such figures of speech as metaphor 
and metonymy in the linguistic analysis goes back in time to 1825, when Christian 
 
 
1  In  a  footnote,  Bréal  (1921[1897]:8)  explains  the  meaning  of  the  term  semantics  in the 
following  manner:  Ση αντική  τέχνη  –  the  science  of  meanings,  from  the  word  ση αίνεινω  – 
‘denote’, as opposed to phonetics, the science of speech sounds.  
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Karl Reisig lectured on the Latin language. However, not all aspects of meaning 
were given equal status and attention. It was the problem of semantic change that 
predominated during the course of the 19
th century.  
In  the  present-day  linguistics,  where  cognitive  theories  are  increasing  in 
popularity and gaining more adherents, semantics seems to occupy more and 
more  central  place  in  grammar.  The  claim  can  be  both  easily  justified  and 
illustrated; for Langacker (1987:12) meaning is what language is all about and 
grammar  is simply the structuring and symbolisation of semantic content. In 
turn, Wierzbicka (1988:3) argues that syntax is semantically motivated, and for 
Lakoff (1987:228) the task of grammar is to show how aspects of form can 
follow  from  aspects  of  meaning  –  just  to  mention  some  of  the  more 
representative  examples.  The  ideas  may  sound  revolutionary  and  innovative 
especially  when  contrasted  with  the  relatively  well-established  (by  linguistic 
standards, of course) generative tradition, but the history of linguistics shows 
that cognitive scholars were by no means the first to conceive them. 
A logico-classificatory approach 
Let us begin our historical outline with Christian Karl Reisig (1792–1829), 
a  classical  philologist,  and  the  first  semasiologist  who  originated,  in  a  truly 
scientific sense, the linguistic quest to find some general principles of semantic 
change with his series of lectures on Latin. He came to the conclusion that the 
study of meaning cannot be successfully dealt with either within etymology, or 
syntax and that is why a new branch of linguistics – semasiology – was needed, 
whose  task  would  be  to  discover  rules  governing  the  development  of  word 
meaning.
2 The objective of Reisig (1890:1–2) was to focus on semantic change 
as a major area of linguistic interest, and to show the unfolding of the train of 
thought with regard to the meaning of the words and to provide a derivation of 
all subsequent meanings from the first in a logical and historical order.
3  
It  needs  to  be  mentioned  that  the  quest  to  reveal  semantic  laws  was 
prompted  by  a  series  of  successes  in  phonetics  and  historical  comparative 
philology in general. The discovery of the first sound laws by Rask and Grimm 
gave  a  fresh  impetus  to  Reisig  (1881–90),  Darmesteter  (1886)  and  Trench 
(1851) who embarked on the insurmountable task of harnessing the semantic 
change in regular patterns. However, Reisig’s (1881), Darmesteter’s (1886) as 
well as Littré’s (1888) studies on semantics had also a practical goal, that is the 
 
 
2 See Reisig (1881–90, I:18–19). 
3 Entfaltung der Gedankenreihe in betreff der Bedeutung der Wörter (Reisig, 1890:1), and to 
provide eine Herleitung der übrigen Bedeutungen von der ersten, logisch und historisch geordnet 
(p.2).  
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writing  of  dictionaries  and  this  involved  ordering  word  meanings  in  lexical 
entries based on truly semantic principles. It seems that no better method than 
relying on logico-classificatory apparatus could have been introduced in those 
circumstances. Consequently, the same approach was applied to the study of 
meaning change. It involved classification of general types or rules of semantic 
change at the word level, taking phonetic laws as a model and not trying to find 
out what actually caused individual changes as such. Reisig (1881–90) perceived 
thoughts and feelings as independent of language and, as a consequence, the 
study of semantic change could only mean the study of the development of ideas 
or thoughts incorporated in the words themselves, disregarding extralinguistic 
factors. The development of thought followed logical principles and the task of 
semasiology was to show how the various meanings of a word arose from the 
original meaning. The approach received the name logical due to the fact that it 
employed logical relations between primary and secondary meanings, figures of 
speech,  as  well  as  two  general  semantic  rules,
4  that  is  restriction  and 
generalisation (extension) of meaning, as tools to classify types of semantic 
change, which involved subordinating it to logic and conceptual apparatus of 
classical rhetoric. 
Notice  that  Reisig’s  semasiology  in addition to showing the tendency to 
abstraction and generalisation, also stressed the fact that language is dynamic in 
nature and has the capacity to develop new concepts, e.g.: 
If a person wished to use a language only insofar as certain items were used by good authors 
in this language, because through these the necessary concepts in the language had been given 
and expressed, this would be confining the use of the language and even limiting its intellectual 
function, for then it would have to be supposed that nobody could bring new concepts to light in 
this language (Reisig, 1839:299).
5 
We  should  not  forget,  however,  that  there  were  also  other  revolutionary 
ideas  of  Reisig’s  which  had  to  wait  almost  two  centuries  to  be  finally 
acknowledged  as  important  linguistic  concepts  by  cognitive  grammar.  These 
included treating semasiology and syntax as one entity; placing the figures of 
speech such as synechdoche, metonymy, metaphor in the central position within 
his  theory  of  language  and  focusing  on  complete  word  groups  rather  than 
 
 
4 Later on a third logico-rhetorical rule, that is transfer of meaning, was added by Tobler 
(1860)  who  studied  and  classified  the  transitions  between  concepts.  He  perceived  transfer  of 
meaning  as  a  semantic  change  from  one  conceptual  sphere  to  another,  whereas  restriction/ 
extension was limited only to the same conceptual sphere. 
5 Wollte man sich einer Sprache bedienen nur in so weit, als gewisse Gegenstände behandelt 
sind von guten Schriftstellern in dieser Sprache, weil durch diese die erforderlichen Begriffe in der 
Sprache gegeben und gehandhabt worden wären, so hiesse diesses, den Gebrauch der Sprache 
beschränken,  ja  sogar  die  Geistesthätigkeit  hemmen;  denn dann müsste vorausgesetzt werden, 
dass Keiner in dieser Sprache neue Begriffe zu Tage fördern könnte [...] (Reisig, 1839:299).  
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analysing  individual Latin words in isolation. Nevertheless, Gordon (1982:3) 
believes that Reisig’s pioneering effort in the study of word-meaning was less 
remarkable in itself than in the attention it drew and influence it exerted upon 
later works on semantic change that followed. 
A socio-historical approach 
The school of hermeneutics, whose main task was the interpretation of 
biblical  texts  and  the  works  of  Friedrich  Schleiermacher  (1768–1834),  in 
particular, influenced the historical approach to the study of semantic change 
pushing  the  search  for  its  motives  in  the  direction  of  external  conditions, 
mostly  historical  and  social  or  cultural.  Notice  that  already  Reisig  (1881) 
stressed the importance of studying in depth the Latin texts and of taking into 
consideration the particularities of the Roman nation. 
Another important source of inspiration came from the éminence grise of 
German  semasiology,  the  philosopher  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  (1767–1835) 
and  his  dynamic  view  of  language.
6 Among  others,  Ludwig Tobler  (1827–
1895)  in  his  etymological  investigations  sought  to  provide  systematic 
principles for the transitions between concepts. Following Humboldt (1836), 
he believed that the vocabulary of a nation represents its framework of thought 
and  that  the  original  meanings  of  word  roots  constitute  the  inner  form  of 
language. Also, Friedrich Haase (1808–1867) stressed the historical point of 
view in his desire to discover how the genius of an individual nation expresses 
itself in the language and how it evolves, but unlike Reisig, Haase (1874–80) 
set about studying the laws that govern the semantic change with no reference 
to logic and instead of deducing them from general logical principles of the 
human  mind,  he  attempted  to  induce  them  from  historical  records.
7  Haase, 
therefore,  speaks  only  of  the  natural  or  historical  and  consequently 
changeable, not the logical and eternal semantic change rules. Seen from this 
perspective, semantic change is a manifestation of historic progress in the life 
of the language.
8  
 
 
6 Humboldt (1836) accepted Kant’s view of the mind as an active shaper of experience, but 
argued  that  the  organising  principles  were  contingent  to  language  which  was  perceived  as  a 
dynamic force capable of making infinite use of finite means. His idea of Weltanschaung or world-
view being embodied in a language implied that the organising principles of experience are not a 
universal feature of human cognition but are to be found in particular languages. He believed that 
language was a creative act of the individual and that humans had an innate capacity for language. 
7 See Haase (1874–80:128). 
8  It  is  worth  mentioning  that  this  progressive  view  was not shared by other 19
th century 
scholars who regarded linguistic change as decay, for example Littré (1888) described words that 
change their meaning as aberrations or illnesses.  
29
Haase (1874–80) offers a hypothesis on how semantic change takes place 
which, from the present point of view, one might venture to call cognitive since 
he claims that the only explanation for it can be sought solely in conceptual 
processing. In his own words: 
Up until now we have considered meaning in relation to form, with which it is closely bound, 
like the soul and the body. But this connection can be suspended; the meaning can be considered 
for itself, and then it is no more than the concept itself for which the word is the symbol. When this 
concept changes without its symbol changing concurrently, then this is evidently a change. This 
change comes only from man’s thoughts, in which the concept itself continues and passes through 
various moments and shapes. These are necessary in a natural connection and must maintain a 
unity (Haase, 1874–80:127).
9 
An entirely different view on language was presented by Richard Chenevix 
Trench (1807–1886) who claimed that the power to name things and language in 
general was a divine gift.
10 In his On the Study of Words (1851) while dealing 
with semantic change, Trench intended it to be, at the same time, a lesson in 
changing morals and history. It is worth pointing out that his moralistic and 
historical  approach  to  semantic change became slowly dominant in England. 
Language was, for Trench (1890[1851]:48) a collection of faded metaphors and 
words were treated as fossilised poetry. The range of problems he tackled in his 
writings included the pejoration and amelioration of meaning, although the 
terms  themselves  were  not  used;  the  modification  of  meaning  in  borrowed 
words; the changes of meaning due to politics, commerce, the influence of the 
Church. In 1857 Trench gave two papers to the Philological Society in which he 
enumerated  various  deficiencies  of  existing  dictionaries  and  insisted  on  the 
introduction of the historical method. 
An interesting application of socio-historical method for analysing semantic 
alternations was put forward by another English scholar – Archibald Henry Sayce 
(1846–1933)  who  considered  comparative  philology  to  be  a  wholly  historical 
science  and  believed  its  goal  was  to  trace  the  development  of  the  human 
intelligence as expressed in the outward and enduring monuments of speech.
11 The 
task of comparative philology was therefore to study the linguistic relics of social 
 
 
9 Wir haben bisher die Bedeutung immer im Verhältniss zur Form betrachtet, mit der sie wie 
Seele und Leib innig verbunden ist. Aber diese Verbindung kann auch aufgehoben, die Bedeutung 
kann für sich betrachtet werden, und dann ist sie nichts weiter als der Begriff selbst, für den das 
Wort das Zeichen ist. Wenn sich nun dieser Begriff ändert, ohne dass sich zugleich sein Zeichen 
ändert, so ist dies offenbar eine Veränderung, die nur aus dem Denken des Menschen hervorgeht, 
in  welchem  der  Begriff  selbst  sich  fortbewegt  und  verschiedene  Momente  und  Gestaltungen 
durchläuft,  die  nothwendig  in  einem  natürlichen  Zusammenhange  stehen  und  eine  Einheit 
behaupten müssen (Haase, 1874–80:127). 
10  It  is  hardly  surprising  as  Trench  was  a  Dean  of  Westminster  and  later Archbishop  of 
Dublin. 
11 See Sayce (1875:XVI).  
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change  and  thought.
12  As  language  was  anchored  in  intelligence  and  society, 
philology became archaeology of the mind. For Sayce the true source of semantic 
change was analogy functioning on the principle of association of ideas, e.g.: 
To make our meaning plain to another, it is necessary that we should employ words which he 
understands, and we can only convey a new idea to him by comparing and likening it to one with 
which he is already familiar. Indeed, it is not only in the instruction of others, but just as much in 
the  development  of  our  knowledge,  that  the  same  contrivance  is  required.  One  idea  is  best 
remembered by being connected with another idea, no matter how fanciful the connection may be; 
and it would be quite impossible to recollect a large mass of isolated ideas. Knowledge is one vast 
chain of associations; and analogy is the principal forger of its several links. […] Language is the 
treasure-house of worn-out metaphors (Sayce, 1875:374). 
In other words, for Sayce language is a social, not individual phenomenon. 
It  interprets  the  society  of  the  past  and  is  interpreted  by  the  society  of  the 
present; it starts with the sentence, not with the word and, in general, should be 
perceived as an expression of thought  
A biologico-evolutionary approach 
A group of French and Belgian linguists, which is often referred to as the 
French ideology, including Honoré Chavée (1815–1877), Abel Hovelacque (1843–
1896),  Julien  Vinson  (1843–1926),  Lucien Adam  (1833–1918),  Paul  Regnaud 
(1838–1910)  among  others,  believed  linguistics  to  be  a  natural  science  and 
language  an  organism  that  is  born,  develops,  experiences  a  brief  moment  of 
evolutionary perfection, degenerates and dies. The linguists, influenced by Charles 
Darwin’s (1809–1882) theory of evolution, defined the study of semantic change 
as the science of the syllabic organisms of thought, which are to each other like the 
races who have spontaneously created them.
13 The word spontaneously should be 
stressed here as the group adopted a view that semantic changes are determined by 
natural laws quite independently of any involvement on the part of speakers. They 
made the basic assumption that language lives, evolves and decays and that is 
manifested not only in semantic, but also phonetic change. This approach, where 
semantic change is the natural result of the life and interaction of words, is wholly 
consistent with August Schleicher’s (1821–1868) naturalism as well as with the 
positivism and empiricism of that time. 
A constant use of expressions and metaphors describing semantic change in 
terms of evolution and biological processes was a characteristic feature of Arsène 
Darmesteter’s (1846–1888) research who was the first to put forward a programme 
 
 
12 Ibid. 
13 La science des organismes syllabiques de la pensée, lesquels sont entre eux comme les 
races qui les ont spontanément créé (Chavée, 1878:XI).  
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for French semantics. He wrote that the absolute truth of the Darwinian theory as 
applied to […] language evolution by natural selection is a fact.
14  
The idea of language being in constant evolution was also shared by Emile 
Littré (1801–1881). For him, the main feature of a language was that it can 
never be fixed as it evolves all the time so that new thoughts could be expressed. 
In his booklet entitled Comment les mots changent de sens reprinted in 1888 
with a preface by Bréal, he presented his theory claiming that change is illness, 
but the language heals itself – metaphorically speaking – by its own therapeutic 
means. Words that change their meaning, however, were regarded as aberrations 
or ailments of language. 
A psychological approach 
The psychological tradition in semasiology was initiated by the work of Moritz 
Lazarus  (1824–1903)  and  Heymann  Steinthal  (1823–1899)  in  the  early  1860s. 
Steinthal tried to refute the belief that language is governed by logical principles and 
that  grammar  is  rooted  in  logic,  instead,  he  claimed  that  language  is  based  on 
psychological  principles,  and  these  principles  are  mainly  of  a  semantic  kind. 
Steinthal and Lazarus (1884) drew their inspiration from the new mathematical and 
mechanistic psychology of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) who defended the 
thesis that the facts of experience, with which psychology is concerned, are to be 
explained not by reference to what he termed faculties, but by reference to the laws 
governing the combination and interaction of those ultimate mental states described 
as sensations, images, ideas or presentations. Thus, the process of semantic change is 
based on apperception which was to be understood as the process of assimilation of 
new ideas and forming larger systems.
15 
While Steinthal and Lazarus tried to apply psychological theories to study 
semantic  change,  Wilhelm  Wundt  (1832–1920)  wanted  to  gain  insights  into 
collective psychological phenomena from the linguistic investigation. His views 
on language can be summarised by the following quotation: 
The language reflects first and foremost man’s world of representations. The changes of word 
meanings reveal the laws governing the change of representations under the influence of changing 
conditions  of  association  and  apperception.  In  the  organic  structure  of  the  language,  in  the 
construction of the parts of speech, that regularity reveals itself which governs the combinations of 
representations under the conditions of nature and culture particular to the speech community 
(Wundt, 1922[1900], I–1:37).
16 
 
 
14 See Darmesteter (1886:19), English edition. 
15 The first linguist to base his analysis of semantic change on the psychological method 
proposed by Steinthal and Lazarus was Max Hecht (1857-?) who applied it to Greek semasiology. 
16 In der Sprache spiegelt sich zunächst die Vorstellungswelt des Menschen. In dem Wandel 
der Wortbedeutungen äußern sich die Gesetze der Veränderungen der Vorstelungen, wie sie unter  
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Notice that both Wundt and Steinthal use the term apperception, but in the 
case  of  Steinthal  it  is  borrowed  from  Herbart,  whereas  for  Wundt  the  term 
apperception is understood in the sense given to it by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
(1646–1716),  where  it  meant  an  inner  act  of  the  will  which  regulated 
association. On the whole, Wundt rejected Herbart’s intellectualism and focused 
on psychological importance of will and action stressing the role of voluntarism 
in  the  processes  of  semantic  change.  In  consequence,  the  laws  of  semantic 
change are based on the general laws of association. The voluntary involvement 
of the will in the creation of new ideas was also emphasised by Frédéric Paulhan 
(1856–1931) who expressed the following opinions on language, e.g.: 
Rather than being an instrument for the communication of the state of our soul, language 
becomes an instrument to make somebody think, feel and act according to our wishes. […] The 
mind gives words a meaning and to a certain extent it creates that meaning. Language provides 
the mind not with the sign of a reality, but with an occasion, a sort of pretext to invent, to form new 
ideas (Paulhan, 1927:22–24).
17 
The main principle of language change is for Paulhan (1927) association by 
resemblance in sound or sense, or analogy. Fair enough, the importance of analogy 
was  also  recognised  by  neo-grammarians,  but  while  they  gave  the  primacy  to 
sound change, Paulhan regarded semantic change as the main type of language 
change.  Significantly,  unlike  other  linguists,  Paulhan  knew  that  it  is  not  only 
important to understand why and how words change, but also how and why they 
stay the same. 
Herbart’s  psychology  of  representation  and  Wundt’s  psychology  of 
association  were  later  replaced  by  Sigmund  Freud’s  (1859–1939) 
psychoanalysis, especially of the type established by Carl Gustav Jung (1875–
1961). The linguist who applied this new approach to the study of semantic 
change was a Swedish scholar Hans Sperber (1885–1960?) for whom the driving 
force in the process of meaning transformation was the emotional charge with 
which  a  word  can  be  loaded.  He  claimed  that  on  this  charge  depended  the 
replacement of one meaning by another. In his own words: 
If at a certain time a given complex of representations is so heavily charged with emotions 
that it drives one word beyond its original meaning and forces it to adopt a new meaning, […] 
we can expect with certainty that this same complex of representations will also force other 
 
 
dem  Einflusse  wechselnder  Assoziations  und  Apperzeptionsbedingungen  stattfinden.  In  dem 
organischen Aufbau der Sprache, in der Fügung der Redeteile gibt sich die Gesetzmäßigkeit kund, 
von der die Verbindung der Vorstelungen unter dem besonderen Natur- und Kulturbedingungen 
der Sprachgemeinschaft beherrscht wird (Wundt, 1922[1900], I–1:37). 
17  Le  langage  plutôt  qu’un  moyen  de  communiquer  notre  état  d’âme,  devient  un  moyen 
d’amener autrui à penser, à sentir et à agir selon que nous le désirons (Paulhan, 1927:22). Le 
langage apporte à l’esprit non pas le signe d’une réalité, mais une occasion, une sorte de prétexte 
à inventer, à former des idées nouvelles … (p.24).  
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expressions that belong to it to transgress their sphere of use and thus develop new meanings 
(Sperber, 1923:67).
18 
The quotation given above shows that one change of meaning can bring 
about a chain reaction causing other words to undergo the same process while 
transgressing into a new lexical field. This happens when we apply the language 
of computers to describe human brain and its intellectual capacities calling the 
head hardware, the mind software, the communication between people interface 
and  a  clear  instruction  user-friendly.  An  example  of  semantic  change,  or 
Bedeutungswechsel as he calls it, given by Sperber comes from German.
19 He 
wants to know where the energy or emotional charge for the replacement of 
houbet (Haupt – ‘head’) by the word Kopf – ‘head’ came from. His observations 
seem to indicate that Kopf was first used in a military language where it had 
secondary  associations  and  emotional  values  that  were  charged  with  more 
energy  than  the  word  Haupt.  Sperber  formulated  a  hypothesis  that  the 
replacement of one meaning by another or of one word by another depends first 
of all on their affective charge. And so, the word Kopf could replace the word 
Haupt because it became firmly integrated into the jargon of soldiers and then 
passed  into  the  standard  language  and  gained  frequency  of  usage.  Sperber 
claimed that if a word, charged with a new meaning, can be integrated into an 
already  existing  semantic  field,  or  –  in  his  terminology  –  complex  of 
representations, it has the best chances in the struggle for survival.  
A functional and contextual approach 
Philipp  Wegener  (1848–1916),  like  his  French  colleagues  Michel  Bréal 
(1832–1915) and Gaston Paris (1839–1903), emphasised the function of words 
and  sentences  and  the  influence  of  the  communication  process  on  them. 
Wegener (1885) put forward a unified theory of language acquisition, language 
use and language change based on strategies, procedures, schemata and models, 
employed  in  the  interaction  between  speaker  and  hearer  in  the  context  of 
situation.  What  is  more,  he  postulated  that  the  speaker’s  and  hearer’s 
interferences, mental schemata, the process of problem-solving and the use of 
analogies play the crucial part in the functioning of language. According to his 
theory, both the speaker and hearer have at their disposal certain schemata for 
 
 
18 Wenn zu einer bestimmten Zeit ein Vorstellungskomplex so stark affektbetont ist, daß er ein 
Wort  über  seine  ursprüngliche  Bedeutung  hinaustreibt  und  es veranlaßt, eine neue Bedeutung 
anzunehmen, [...] mit Bestimmtheit zu erwarten ist, daß derselbe Vorstellungskomplex auch andere 
ihm  angehörige  Ausdrücke  zur  Überschreitung  ihrer  Verwendungssphäre  und  dam  it  zur 
Entwicklung neuer Bedeutungen treiben wird (Sperber, 1923:67). 
19 See Sperber (1923:30–31).  
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the construction and reconstruction of meaning. These are schemata of time, 
space  and  movement;  actions  follow  each  other  in  time,  take  place  in  some 
context, have purpose and are executed according to some rules and sequences. 
In case we lack a schema, we can build a new one in analogy with already 
known ones. In Wegener’s (1885) model, words do not carry meaning, but they 
absorb  meaning  from  the  context  or  the  intention  of  the  speaker  and  the 
understanding  by  the  hearer.  The  interpretation  of  sentences  is  based  on 
conclusions or interferences drawn from the context and the meaning emerges 
from communication as situated action.  
In the works of Philipp Wegener and – to some extent – Johann Stöcklein 
and Hermann Paul (1846–1921), the meaning of words is gradually detached 
from its etymological ties and perceived as a result of contextual language use. It 
was believed to be created anew in each act of communication and regarded as 
context-dependent, consequently it was possible to differentiate between usual 
and occasional meaning (see Paul, 1891:65). 
 Another contextual theory of semantic variation and change was developed 
by a British psychologist of the early 20
th century George Frederick Stout (1860–
1944), a forerunner of Gestalt psychology. The meaning of words is for him not, as 
many German psychological semanticists held, a representation or mental image 
associated with a word, but a conceptual system, formed and shaped by other 
systems and controlled by the topic of the discourse. He explains the fact that 
words have occasional apart from usual meanings in the following manner: 
Each expressive sign has power to objectify its associate system only in so far as this system 
is capable of being incorporated in the conceptual whole which is in process of construction. 
Hence, the signification of words varies according to the context in which they appear. […] The 
usual or general signification is not in itself one of the significations borne by a word. It is a 
condition which circumscribes within more or less vague and shifting limits the divergence of 
occasional meanings (Stout, 1891:194). 
Semantic change is accounted for by him in terms of the mutual shaping of 
word-meanings, themselves viewed as small conceptual systems forming part of 
larger structures, such as the sentence and discourse. Word-meaning is seen as a 
rather  fuzzy  territory  delimited  vaguely  by  the  usual  meaning,  but  always 
retracted and reshaped by the use of words in discourse and in situation, which 
gives them their occasional meanings. 
The  French  historical  comparative  linguist Antoine  Meillet  (1866–1936) 
studied  semantic  change  as  a  function  of  changes  in  social  groups  and 
generations of speakers. His student, Kristoffer Nyrop (1848–1931), continued 
to work within this sociological framework but also stressed that changes in the 
meanings  of  words  are  dependent  on  the  psychological  constitution  of  the 
speaker,  and  on  the  co-context  and  context  in  which  words  are  used.  This 
context-dependency  brings  about  what  Nyrop  (1913)  called  the  relativity  of 
meaning defined along the following lines:  
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The meaning of words is not absolute. […] Their semantic value depends on the whole and 
can differ in many ways. As the word has commonly no isolated existence, one should study it, so 
to speak, ‘in function’, and one should not only take into consideration the surrounding words, but 
also the concomitant circumstances, because otherwise one will not arrive at a correct conception 
of the meaning it represents (Nyrop, 1913:15).
20 
According to Nerlich (1992:258), the works of Alan Henderson Gardiner 
(1879–1963)  and  John  Rupert  Firth  (1890–1960),  influenced  by  Bronisław 
Malinowski’s  (1884–1942)  research  and  often  referred  to  as  the  British 
contextualism,  represented  a  last  linguistic  attempt  at  explaining  change  of 
meaning by use and context. After that semantics drifted more and more away 
from a diachronic towards a more structural and synchronic perspective initiated 
by  the  founder  fathers  of  structuralism.  The  crowning  achievement  of  this 
period, sometimes even considered anachronistic,
21 was a monumental work on 
semantic  change  published  in  1931  by  the  Swedish  philologist  Gustaf  Stern 
entitled Meaning and Change of Meaning, with Special Reference to the English 
Language. For Ullmann (1962:7), Stern’s monograph represents a synthesis of 
the  19
th  century  linguistic  investigations  of  causes  and  laws  of  semantic 
change.
22 It must be stated, however, that Stern did not align himself with any 
particular school of thought, nor any of his individual predecessors.  
Structuralism 
The  1930s  and  1940s  witnessed  the  rise  of  structural  linguistics.  The 
revolution was launched by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) in Switzerland, 
and  was  developed  by  Nikolaus  S. Trubetzkoy  (1890–1938)  in Vienna, Vilem 
Mathesius  (1882–1945)  in  Prague,  Viggo  Brøndal  (1887–1942)  and  Louis 
Hjelmslev (1899–1965) in Copenhagen and by Edward Sapir (1884–1939) and 
Leonard Bloomfield (1887–1949) in the United States. Saussure in his Cours de 
linguistique  générale  published  in  1916  opposed  to  the  previously  widespread 
view  that  linguistics  must  be  historical  and  –  as  a  consequence  –  pushed  the 
problem of semantic change to the periphery of linguistic interests where it stayed 
for  several  decades.  Instead,  Saussure  introduced  the  distinction  between 
synchrony and diachrony and argued that the synchronic description of particular 
 
 
20 Le sens des mots n’est pas absolut. [...] leur valeur sémantique depend de l’ensemble et 
peut se nuancer de beaucoup de maniéres. Comme le mot ordinairement n’a pas d’existence isolée 
[…],  il  faut  l’étudier  pour  ainsi  dire  ‘en  fonction’,  et  il  faut  prendre  en  consideration  non 
seulement  les  mots  environnants,  mais  aussi  les  circonstances  concomitants,  sans  quoi  on 
n’arrivera pas à une juste notion du sens qu’il reprêsente (Nyrop, 1913:15). 
21 See Gordon (1982:51). 
22  The  19
th  century  tradition  of  historical  semantics  was  later  also  continued  by  Stephen 
Ullmann (1914–1976).   
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languages could be equally scientific and explanatory. He believed that all changes 
originated  outside  the  language  system  itself.  Nevertheless,  Lyons  (1981:218) 
draws our attention to the fact that Saussure was not at all denying the validity of 
historical explanation and never abandoned his interest in historical linguistics 
considering the synchronic and diachronic modes as complementary.  
 On the whole, structural linguists aimed at defining linguistic units in terms of 
their relations to one another, i.e. in analytic operations that exhibit those relations. 
Semantic intuitions did not seem to be amenable to objective control. Bloomfield 
(1933:139–57), for example, was deeply troubled about the linguist’s unavoidable 
reliance on semantic information. He regarded it as a serious weakness and could 
see  no  remedy  for  it.  Warren  (1992:11)  maintains  that  Bloomfield  perceived 
semantic  change  as  some  meaning  being  transformed  from  one  word  form  to 
another, or to put it in a different way, he excluded the possibility that an existing 
word  form  may  take on an unexpressed meaning. Bloomfield (1933) gives an 
example of how extension can take place by discussing the narrowing of meaning 
in the case of meat originally referring to ‘food’. 
Field theory approach 
In  the  1930s  Jost  Trier  (1894–1970)  published  a  series  of  articles  on 
semantic  field  theory  which  opened  a  new  phase  in  the  study  of  semantic 
change.
23 He claimed that: 
[…] individual words in a language do not stand alone but are arranged in meaning-groups. 
We are not referring here to an etymological group, at least not to those words which are grouped 
with hypothetical roots, but rather a group in which the conceptual contents of its members are all 
inter-related. This connection is not intended as a mutual ordering for a chain of associations but 
as such that the whole group marks out a semantic field which is internally structured . Here, as in 
a mosaic, words fit together, each with different contours and such that the contours fit and all 
together the words do not reduce to a useless abstraction but merge into a conceptual unity (Trier, 
1932:418–19).
24 
 
 
23 The notion of field was very popular at that time in physics, where it was used in the study 
of magnetic fields, gravitational fields, electric fields and particle fields. The term semantic field 
was first used by G. Ipsen in 1924 (see Ullmann, 1962:244), but Trier is generally regarded as the 
most important and influential of the German field linguists. 
24  Die  Eigenwörter  stehen  in  einer  Sprache  nicht  allein,  sondern  sind  eingeordnet  in 
Bedeutungsgruppen;  damit  ist  nicht  eine  etymologische  Gruppe  gemeint,  am  wenigsten  um 
chimärische Wurzeln aufgereihte Wörter, sondern solche, deren gegenständlicher Sinngehalt mit 
andern Sinngehalten verknüpft ist. Diese Verknüpftung aber ist nicht als Aneinanderreihung an 
einem Assoziationsfaden gemeint, sondern so, dass die ganze Grupp ein Bedeutungsfeld absteckt, 
das in sich gegliedert ist wie in einem Mosaik fügt sich hier Wort an Wort, jedes anders umrissen, 
doch so, dass die Konturen aneinander passen und alle zusammen in einer Sinneinheit höherer 
Ordung auf, nicht in einer faulen Abstraktion untergehen (Trier, 1932:418–19).  
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In brief, the theory claims that words make part of lexical fields which in 
turn cover conceptual fields. The meaning of a word depends on which area of a 
field it covers and on relation it has with its neighbours or – in other words – it 
depends on commutable delimitation. If a word changes its meaning, this will 
necessarily result in modifications to the whole system affecting the meanings of 
words in the same field. Therefore, in investigations of semantic change, the 
object  of  study  should  be  lexical  fields  and  not  words  in  isolation.  Trier’s 
monograph on terms of knowledge and intelligence published in 1931 was one 
of the first attempts to introduce Ferdinand de Saussure’s ideas into semantics. 
From  Saussure  Trier  (1932)  drew  the  principle  of  language  as  a  system  of 
oppositions  which  was  encapsulated  into  the  perception  of  language  as  an 
organic whole and a dynamic system borrowed from Humbolt and advocated in 
biologico-evolutionary approach. The very field view of meaning was also not 
completely new as, according to Gordon (1982:70), it can be traced back to the 
work of such scholars as Haase and Heerdegen.  
 Weisgerber (1927, 1962) developed further the theoretical basis of Trier’s 
field theory concept and, therefore, the theory is frequently referred to as Trier-
Weisgerber  theory.  In  contrast  to  the  19
th  century  historical-philological 
approach where, as it was shown, language was mostly viewed as a form of self-
expression  of  an  individual  or  community,  and  meaning  as  a  psychological 
phenomenon,  Weisgerber  (1927)  strongly  objected  to  this  atomistic  and 
historically-oriented method. Instead, he stressed that the nature of meaning is 
linguistic not psychological and semantics can say nothing about psychological 
phenomena  which  bear  on  language.
25  Svensson  (1997:6)  notes  that  in 
Weisgerber’s view, whatever extralinguistic knowledge is accessible to language 
speakers  is  encyclopaedic  and,  therefore,  distinct  from  linguistic  knowledge. 
Meaning,  on  the  other  hand,  was  no  longer  seen  as  being  anchored  in  the 
etymological or diachronic ancestry of a word, but as emerging from synchronic 
relations between words in a field. 
Generative linguistics and componential analysis 
Chomsky’s system of transformational-generative grammar was put forward 
in  the  late  1950s  as  a  reaction  to  the  previously  dominant  Bloomfieldian 
linguistic  behaviourism.  Lyons  (1981:210)  points  out  that  generativism 
developed  a  particular  version  of  structuralism  and,  that  is  why,  it  was 
 
 
25  Similarly  Edmund  Husserl’s  (1859–1938)  phenomenological  analysis  and  its 
antipsychologism also reinforced the structuralist point of view that semantic fields should be 
studied in themselves and for themselves and not with reference to psychological concepts or real 
world objects.  
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characteristic of generative linguistics to see language change as a secondary 
issue  far  from  the  mainstream  of  linguistic  studies  which  were  focused  on 
synchronic  aspects  of  language.  The  almost  forgotten  at  that  time  issue  of 
semantic change, in very few studies devoted to the problem, was analysed in 
terms of the addition, loss or reordering of the rules that determine a speaker’s 
linguistic competence. For example, McLaughlin (1970) states: 
In dealing with semantic change, we will need to be concerned both with the nature of lexical 
entries in the dictionary and the operation of projection rules. It seems reasonable to suppose that 
changes in the first will cause changes in the second. Specifically, change in a lexical entry may be 
characterized by changes in the syntactic markers, the semantic markers, the distinguishers, the 
selection restrictions, or any combination of these. For any given, new markers, distinguishers, or 
restrictions may be added, while old ones may be lost (McLaughlin, 1970:287f). 
In so far as the competence/performance dichotomy can be identified with the 
langue/parole distinction of Saussurean structuralism, the contribution made to the 
theory and methodology of historical semantics by generativists can be seen as a 
refinement and development of the structuralists’ conception of language change. 
Preference was given to what was classified as internal factors and disregarding or 
marginalising  extralinguistic  causes.  Without  doubt,  Chomsky's  analysis  of 
language  was  determinedly  and  pragmatically  abstract.  He  did  not  direct  his 
attention towards the ways in which language was used in society, but instead 
sought to address the ideal speaker-hearer in a homogeneous speech community. 
Of course there is no such a person as an ideal speaker-hearer and all speech 
communities, far from being homogeneous, are self evidently heterogeneous. On 
the whole, the structuralists’ notion of self-regulation has been replaced with that 
of the restructuring of the rules of the language system. Generativists were also 
much interested in the problem of language acquisition by children.
26  
The idea that semantics could be handled in terms of components was argued 
with the investigation of kinship terms.
27 Loundsbury (1956:158) observed that in 
Spanish, for instance, the sex of the people involved is clearly marked with the –o 
ending for male and – a for female as in: tío – ‘uncle’, tía – ‘aunt’. It was noted 
that it could be possible to classify kinship terms with reference to categories such 
as sex, generation differences and degrees of relationship. Given these three sets of 
criteria all the English kinship terms could be described in terms of components – 
 
 
26 They stressed the fact that the child who begins to acquire his native language is not taught 
the rules of the underlying system, but must infer these rules from the patterns of correspondence 
between form and meaning which he detects in the utterances that he hears around him. They also 
postulated the existence of the so-called language faculty independent of other mind components 
(see Chomsky, 1965:56). 
27 Componential analysis owes much to structuralist phonology. It was based on Hjelmslev’s 
(1943) conviction that a linguistic sign can be decomposed into smaller semantic units which he 
called figurae.  
39
the total meaning of a word being seen as a number of distinct elements. Cassirer 
(1956:56)  suggested  that  the  postulation  of  a  concept  of  distinctive  features 
originates in a universal characteristic of thinking and Nida (1951) introduced a 
coherent terminology for the description of meaning in componential terms. All 
lexemes in all languages are perceived as complexes of universal atomic features 
called semes, semantic primitives or primes; comparable with the distinctive 
features of phonology constituting phonemes. 
Voyles (1973) took the grammar of Katz and Postal (1964) as his point of 
departure  and  tried  to  account  for  the  underlying  operations  involved  in  the 
process  of  semantic  change.  His  repertoire  of  analytic  concepts  included 
semantic  features,  lexical  insertion  rules,  projection  rules  and  semantic 
redundancy rules. He proposed that words can change their meanings because 
semantic  features  can  be  added  and  deleted  by  the  insertion  rules  and 
redundancy rules. Projection rules, on the other hand, operate on lexical entries 
and  combine  the  semantic readings of various lexical items until a semantic 
interpretation of the entire sentence is produced. Voyles accepts the standard 
generative position that there is a restricted set of semantic features and that no 
new  features  can  arise.  The  well-known  example  of  narrowing  of  meaning, 
where meat changes its original O.E. meaning ‘food’, is claimed to be a situation 
of obligatory Feature Addition rule application:
28  
 
 +Noun 
               +Flesh 
 +Edible 
 
 
Apart from Voyles’(1973) componential account for semantic alterations, 
Görlach  (1974),  Leech  (1974),  Werth  (1974),  Berndt  (1982)  and  Kleparski 
(1990)  are  the  very  few  scholars  who  employed  feature  notation  in  the 
description  of  sense  developments.  Especially  a  well-developed  Kleparski’s 
(1990) approach is worth taking a closer look at. While investigating evaluative 
developments  in  the  domain of HUMANS, the author attempted to arrive at 
some  regularities  concerning  semantic  change  in  general.  Analysing  a 
particularly copious growth of negatively, as well as less numerous positively 
loaded group of lexical items referring to both women and men in English, he 
concludes  that  evaluative  developments  assume  gradual  and  directional 
character.  It  is  evidenced  by  the  possibility  of  specifying  diverse  stages 
especially in the pejorative developments affecting HUMANS. Kleparski (1990) 
distinguishes  four  stages:  (1)  social  pejoration,  (2)  aesthetic  pejoration,  (3) 
behavioural  pejoration  and  (4)  moral  pejoration.  Describing  the  changes  in 
 
 
28 See Voyles (1973:110).  
40
meaning as directional was based on his observations that, e.g., the presence of 
socially negative elements in a given structure often precedes the association of 
a given lexical unit with behaviourally negative elements or morally negative 
elements. In the analysis of semantic development he employs three types of 
components (see Kleparski, 1990:48): 
 
a)  common, e.g.: +OBJECT, +COUNTABLE, +ANIMATE, +HUMAN;  
b)  diagnostic, e.g.: (+MOVEMENT), (+MALE), (+ADULT), 
(+MISERABLE); 
c)  supplementary, e.g.: /+OLD/, /+MOUNTED/, /+MILITARY/, 
/+POLITICAL/; 
 
and the various processes operative in the development of meaning such as: 
component addition, component loss, change of component type – weakening or 
strengthening,  change  of  component  value,  component  adjustment  and 
component substitution.
29 A representative example of the way Kleparski (1990) 
analyses semantic change may be illustrated by the pejorative development of 
boor:  
 
Stage A > 
 
+HUMAN 
(+MALE) 
([COUNTRY 
[ORIGIN]]) 
 
 
 
 
addition 
 
Stage B > 
 
+HUMAN 
(+MALE) 
([COUNTRY 
[ORIGIN]]) 
({UNREFINED 
UNMANNERED}) 
 
 
weakening 
Stage C > 
 
+HUMAN 
(+MALE) 
/[COUNTRY 
[ORIGIN]]/ 
({UNREFINED 
UNMANNERED}) 
 
 
loss 
Stage D 
 
+HUMAN 
(+MALE) 
({UNREFINED 
UNMANNERED}) 
 
 
As evidenced by Kleparski (1990:108), Stage A roughly corresponds to the 
O.E.  meaning  ‘countryman’. At  the  end  of  the  16
th  century  a  new  meaning 
developed:  boor  started  to  be  used  with  reference  to  rustics  with  the  strong 
implications of lack of refinement which was marked by Kleparski in Stage B as 
addition of behaviourally negative feature ({UNREFINED UNMANNERED}). 
 
 
29 The function of common components is to delimit boundaries of a particular semantic 
domain by stating the necessary and sufficient features. On the other hand, diagnostic components 
specify those characteristics of meaning which are shared by one or more, but not by all meanings 
in  the  same  semantic  domain.  Finally,  supplementary  components  serve  to  encode  the  bits  of 
associative information that are not necessary, or significant, for establishing minimal contrasts.  
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Stage C represents the widening of meaning conditioned by the weakening of 
the diagnostic, socially evaluative component ([COUNTRY [ORIGIN]]), which 
was  eventually  lost  in  Stage  D  yielding  the  modern  meaning  of  ‘unrefined, 
unmannered person’ with no elements to imply that the person must be country-
born. 
Cognitive linguistics approach 
A linguistic theory called cognitive grammar is mainly characterised by the 
notion of language being grounded in cognition. According to Langacker (1987), 
who is generally considered one of its principal contributors, cognitive linguistics 
is  a  very  natural  framework  in  the  sense  that  its  notions  reflect  man’s  basic 
cognitive abilities such as viewing, distancing, scanning or mental movement.
30 As 
has become manifest in recent research, for instance, on mirror neurons, cognition 
is an integrated human ability which cannot be separated from other functions. The 
holistic approach to language is explained by Taylor (1989) in the following way:  
Whereas generativists regard knowledge of language as an autonomous component of the 
mind, independent, in principle, from other kinds of knowledge and from other cognitive skills, 
cognitivists  posit  an  intimate,  dialectic  relationship  between  the  structure  and  function  of 
language on the one hand, and non-linguistic skills and knowledge on the other. Language being 
at once both the creation of human cognition and an instrument in its service, is thus more likely 
than  not  to  reflect,  in  its  structure  and  functioning,  more  general  cognitive  abilities  (Taylor, 
1989:ix). 
Although Langacker (1999:172) withdraws any claim for explaining actual 
semantic change and admits that his analyses have not been based on serious 
historical investigation, the problem of semantic change received considerable 
amount of attention in works such as, among others, Sweetser (1990), Geeraerts 
(1983a, 1997), Kleparski (1997, 2002). In regarding language as a pragmatic and 
functional  continuum,  cognitive  linguists  transcend  formerly  irreconcilable 
dichotomies and present the relationship between langue and parole, synchrony 
and diachrony, form and function or literal and figurative language as gradual 
and  interactive  phenomena  rather  than  incompatible  poles.  In  this  way,  the 
 
 
30  Langacker  (1987:134)  states  that  our  cognitive  ability  to  conceptualize  situations  at 
varying levels of schematicity is undeniable. He defines viewing as the mental ability of visualising 
what an object looks like when seen from different angles or perspective, with direct consequences 
for its perceived proximity and salience. Cognitive distance, on the other hand, refers to a measure 
reflecting the number and likelihood of cognitive events needed to relate two notions, e.g. the 
degree to which a schema is elaborated by a particular instantiation: the distance between [THING] 
and [DOG] is greater than between [THING] and [ANIMAL]. Another cognitive ability – scanning 
– is an operation that relates a standard of comparison and a target, registering any discrepancy 
between them (see Langacker, 1987:492).  
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various grammatical levels and categories combine in an information continuum 
from semantics to pragmatics, from meaning to form. 
Following  the  cognitive  approach,  Sweetser (1990:20–21) states that our 
experience and knowledge of the world model how we understand language and 
thought  which,  consequently,  affects  the  way  we  express  ourselves.  She 
establishes three possibilities of how our linguistic expressions are shaped, each 
of the possibilities leading to a different domain: 
 
a) as a description (model of the world)  Real world domain 
b) as an action (an act in the world being described)  Speech-act domain 
c) as an epistemic or logical entity (premise or  
 conclusion in our world of reasoning) 
Epistemic domain 
 
These domains are not independent, but are linked by our cognitive system, and 
this link is carried out by metaphor. Sweetser believes that:  
Using  the  idea  of  systematic  metaphorical  structuring  of  one  domain  (e.g.  the  epistemic 
domain) in terms of another (e.g. the sociophysical domain), cognitive semantics may well be 
equipped  to  make  headway  in  the  murky  area  of  meaning-change,  as  well  as  in  the  area  of 
synchronic semantic structure (Sweetser, 1990:21). 
Adopting this view of mutual metaphorical structuring of domains, Sweetser 
claims that the paths of semantic change are multidirectional. They can lead 
from  a  concrete  source  domain  to  an  abstract  target  domain,  or  in  other 
direction;  from  the  external  (sociophysical)  domain  to  internal  (emotional, 
psychological) domain. In the case of perception verbs, chosen by Sweetser for 
analysis,  these  metaphorical  mappings  take  place  between  the  vocabulary  of 
physical perception (external source domain) and the vocabulary of internal self 
and  sensations  (internal  target  domain).  She  establishes  the  following 
correlations pertaining to the paths of semantic change in the case of perception 
verbs: 
 
VISION   →   KNOWLEDGE 
HEARING   →   HEED   →   OBEY 
TASTE    →   LIKES/DISLIKES 
TOUCH   →   FEELINGS 
SMELL   →   DISLIKEABLE FEELINGS 
 
Thus,  the  verb  see  has  two  meanings,  that  is,  ‘physical  vision’  and 
‘knowledge’. The correlation is also visible in other languages: Pol. widzieć – 
‘to see’ and wiedzieć – ‘to know’, Gk. eidon – ‘to see’ and perf. oida – ‘know’ 
(>Eng. idea); or in the opposite direction: Eng. wise, wit alongside the more 
physical witness.   
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Sweetser (1990:39) states that in this example the sense of vision is not only 
connected with the general experience or perception, but also with the overall 
mental capacities. The vision/intellection metaphor is very productive in modern 
English. Note that a physical object may be opaque or transparent, likewise an 
argument or a proposition may be crystal-clear, opaque, transparent, muddy, or 
murky to our mental vision. According to Sweetser (1990:45), such large scale 
conceptual  metaphors  are of the highest importance both for synchronic and 
diachronic semantic analysis and so, through a historical investigation of paths 
of semantic change, it is possible to elucidate synchronic semantic connections 
between lexical domains. The claim made here is that the linguistic research can 
be also conducted in the opposite direction. 
In cognitive approaches the configuration of concepts is also typically seen 
as a configuration of prototypes. Just like Sweetser (1990) drew much of her 
inspiration from earlier studies on metaphor incorporating many of Lakoff and 
Johnson’s (1980) ideas in her work, Geeraerts (1983,1997) applied the notions 
of  prototypicality  and  family  resemblance  (in  the  sense  of  Wittgenstein  and 
Rosch) to historical semantics. At the same time, the diachronic processes of 
language change corroborate the cognitive assumptions on categorisation while 
prototypical and radial models satisfy the demand of stability and flexibility. In 
this  respect,  four  structural  features  of  prototypically  organised  semantic 
categories  are  correlated  with  corresponding  hypotheses  for  semasiological 
change formulated by Geeraerts (1997:23). 
In his case study, Geeraerts (1983) considers the semantic development of 
Dutch vergrijpen from 1500 up to 1900 showing that meaning change exhibits 
characteristics  that  correspond  to  the  structure  of  the  prototype. The  general 
picture  of  the  changes  in  vergrijpen  is  one  of  clusters  of  interlocking  and 
overlapping senses. There are two central meanings: ‘to do something wrong’ 
and  ‘to  mistake’,  but  even  on  the  highest  level  of  structural  organisation, 
meanings  combine  and  interrelate  to  form  conceptual  networks  which,  in 
Geeraerts’ (1983:17) words, corroborates the thesis that diachronic semantics 
supports prototype theory. 
Whereas  Geeraerts  (1983,  1997)  focuses  mostly  on  the  nuances  in  a 
prototypical conceptual structure and their reciprocal configurations, Kleparski 
(1997) delves into the intricate mechanisms of semantic shift putting forward a 
comprehensive  model  of  meaning  change  tested  against  a  bulk  of  evidence 
comprising Mid.E. and E.Mod.E. synonyms of GIRL/YOUNG WOMAN. He 
stresses that semantic structures at all levels may be characterised relative to 
cognitive domains which he understands and refers to as conceptual domains, 
e.g.:  DOMAIN  OF  SEX,  AGE,  FUNCTIONS,  HABITATION, 
CHARACTER,  etc.  In  the  framework  developed  by  the  author,  a  lexical 
category receives its meaning by highlighting or being entrenched in particular 
locations within attributive paths of these domains, for example, Mid.E. vecke –  
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‘old  woman’  is  core-entrenched  in  the  conceptual  category  OLD  FEMALE 
HUMAN BEING while Mid.E. maid – ‘girl, young woman’ may be related not 
only  to  YOUNG  FEMALE  HUMAN  BEING,  but  it  is  also  claimed  to  be 
linked  to  different  locations  within  the  attributive  paths  of  such  conceptual 
domains  as  DOMAIN  OF  SEXUAL  ACTIVITY  and  DOMAIN  OF 
FUNCTIONS. The inclusion of two last domains makes the category a case of 
complex entrenchment and accounts for the additional meaning of ‘virgin’ and 
‘female servant’ which the lexical item tends to indicate. 
In  terms  of  the  mechanisms  adopted  by  Kleparski  (1997),  the  original 
semantics of Mid.E. wench – ‘child of either sex’ involves the entrenchment link to 
attributive path of DOMAIN OF AGE […] and the highlighting of the appropriate 
value (VERY YOUNG) attended by highlighting of either of the two locations 
specified for the attributive path of DOMAIN OF SEX […], i.e., (FEMALE) or 
(MALE).  The  change  of  meaning  from  ‘child  of  either  sex’  into  ‘girl,  young 
woman’ takes place due to the highlighting of the value (YOUNG), coupled with 
the highlighting of the attributive value (FEMALE) and eclipsing of the originally 
highlighted  (MALE).  During  the  L.Mid.E.  period,  however,  apart  from  the 
existence of a categorically central sense-thread ‘girl, young woman’, the semantic 
pole of wench started to be linked to the locations within the attributive paths of 
the DOMAIN OF CHARACTER, BEHAVIOUR AND MORALITY […], on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  DOMAIN  OF  FUNCTIONS  […]  yielding  the  well-
documented meanings of ‘wanton woman’ and ‘female servant’, respectively.  
Conclusion 
From  the  foregoing  discussion  of  main  frameworks  and  methodological 
approaches to semantic change we can draw the following observation. The study 
of semantic change has always been related to the theory of meaning in general, 
nevertheless, our outline shows that the 19
th century scholars in particular put the 
question of meaning change high on their agendas and considered it to be vital for 
linguistic  investigation.  Therefore,  their  studies  can  be  by  no  means  ignored, 
otherwise scientific progress would represent a futile idea. This is merely one of 
the reasons why any reliable approach to semantic change cannot be carried out 
successfully without reference to the great linguistic achievements made in the 
field of semantics during the two past centuries.  
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